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Terrorism, Ticking Time-Bombs, and Torture. By Fritz Allhoff. Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 2012. Pp. xii, 266. Price: $35.00
(Paperback). Reviewed by John Calhoun.
The "ticking time-bomb" scenario-by now a philosophical clichd-
posits an encounter with an apprehended terrorist suspect who allegedly knows
the whereabouts of a ticking time-bomb hidden in a densely populated area.
The terrorist refuses to talk. Law enforcement must decide whether to torture
the suspect in an attempt to obtain information before the bomb explodes.
Would torturing the suspect be moral? Should it be legal? In Terrorism, Ticking
Time-Bombs, and Torture, philosopher Fritz Allhoff uses this hypothetical to
launch an argument that the answer to both of these questions should be "yes"
in a broader range of contexts than is commonly accepted. Allhoff s book is an
excellent summary of the debates about the morality and legality of torture.
However, his argument for the legal permissibility of torture-although
novel-is unpersuasive, and his argument for the morality of torture is too
tethered to the unrealistic ticking-time-bomb clich6 to do any better.
Terrorism, Ticking Time-Bombs, and Torture is clearly structured and
thoroughly argued. Allhoff defines carefully all his key terms and concepts
before proceeding to the core of his argument. For example, he explicitly
defines torture as "the intentional use of force against noncombatants or their
property to intentionally instill fear in the hopes of realizing some ideological
aim" (p. 5). Although the inclusion of intention and the use of the word
"noncombatants" instead of "innocent victims" are both contestable, Allhoff
makes a convincing case for his particular definition. The author's clear and
logical reasoning is a welcome antidote to cable television's alternately
idealistic or jingoistic treatment of torture policy. Although Allhoff spends the
first six chapters of his book setting up his argument, the book rewards readers
for their patience.
Allhoff's examination of the moral permissibility of torture begins in
Chapter 7. All of the discussion in this Chapter revolves around slight
variations of the "ticking time-bomb" scenario. Allhoff criticizes the notion that
governments should not torture because it is only sporadically effective, and
that there are better intelligence-collection tools such as spies and informants
(pp. 140-46). He makes a compelling case that the patchy or even unlikely
success of torture compared to that of other tools does not in itself prove that
governments should never torture. In certain circumstances, with all other
options exhausted, torture would make sense.
Allhoff then attacks the position that torture is impermissible because a
sanctioned torture regime would corrupt the medical and military professions.
According to Allhoff, a legally sanctioned torture regime requires the
complicity of medical professionals and the training of skilled torturers. It is
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commonplace to assert that using doctors or military personnel during torture
sessions would corrupt professionals whom society expects to adhere to their
respective moral cores. Allhoff responds that a torture regime would not
necessarily require medical staff and that torture sessions could be conducted
by a small cadre of Navy SEALs instead of a new, larger unit of specially-
trained torturers.
Many readers will not find Allhoff's response particularly reassuring,
especially regarding the medical profession. A policy that denies tortured
suspects medical treatment does not seem morally superior to a policy that
provides tortured suspects medical treatment while nonetheless running the risk
that a doctor's ethical sensibilities could be corrupted. Even convicted
criminals are afforded treatment, so denying treatment to a suspected terrorist
fails to accord with basic principles of justice in our legal system. Furthermore,
even if law enforcement identified an "actual" terrorist, competent medical
personnel on the scene would help ensure that torture does not undermine its
own ends by pushing an interrogated suspect into such a state of incoherence or
delirium that he or she no longer has the mental capacity to provide useful
information. Building a wall between torture and the medical profession is thus
questionable both morally and practically. Allhoff does not address either of
these objections.
Instead, Allhoff focuses on the fact that in a true "ticking time-bomb"
scenario, institutional corruption would be less of a concern than the imminent
disaster. On the one hand, Allhoff argues, is the value of averting dozens,
hundreds, or thousands of deaths. On the other hand is the chance that the
medical profession, despite its size and preexisting mores, could nonetheless be
meaningfully corrupted by association with occasional torture sessions.
Applying a utilitarian calculus to these two values suggests that institutional
niceties should take a backseat to impending disaster. A full accounting of this
elaborate trade-off is beyond the scope of this review, but Allhoff raises a
stimulating topic for further debate.
What will likely prove to be the most contentious part of Allhoff's book
is his response to the slippery-slope argument about torture normalization. The
slippery-slope argument states that once we countenance torture in limited
circumstances, we will grow to approve the use of torture in an ever-widening
range of cases. Allhoff does not necessarily disagree, responding that the
slippery slope might not lead to an immoral result, because there is in fact a
broader range of morally acceptable torture scenarios than the "ticking time-
bomb" scenario alone.
In order to elaborate his point, Allhoff proposes a modification of the
standard ticking time-bomb clichd. Instead of informants fingering one bomb-
planter, suppose they only provide enough evidence to narrow the range of
suspects to ten people. Should the government torture all ten people, certain
that nine innocents will be tortured in the process? Allhoff argues that once one
concedes that it is moral to torture one person to save a thousand, one must also
concede that it would be moral to torture all ten people in order to glean crucial
information about the location of a bomb.
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Allhoff is certainly not the first author to consider this problem, and his
utilitarian response is also nothing new.' Even if you grant Allhoff his ten-to-
one argument, a reader with any degree of familiarity with the moral
philosophy of torture might be forgiven some exasperation at Allhoff's
repeated reliance on the "ticking time-bomb" clich6. As Michael Davis and
others have argued, not only is the "ticking time-bomb" scenario hackneyed, it
is also an extremely unlikely event. Can such a contrivance really help us make
the sort of messy decisions we may face in the future? Likely not.
On the moral and practical limitations of torture, Allhoff's book is
valuable for its highly methodical and balanced treatment. While this
characteristic makes Terrorism, Ticking Time-Bombs, and Torture a superb
primer on the ethics of torture, it does not make for groundbreaking analysis. A
richer account of the morality of torture would venture forth from the safety of
the "ticking time-bomb" scenario into the full complexity of reality.
Allhoff's discussion in Chapter 8 of the legality of torture is much more
novel than his discussion of the morality, although it, too, is not totally
persuasive. Allhoff introduces a variety of proposals before settling on his
preferred legal defense of prospective torturers: torturers could claim the
necessity defense under § 3.02 of the Model Penal Code. The necessity defense
in § 3.02 allows the excusal of illegal conduct undertaken to prevent an even
greater "harm or evil" than the illegal conduct itself, so long as (1) there are no
other, less harmful courses of action available, and (2) "a legislative purpose to
exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly appear" (p. 188).2
Allhoff relies on his utilitarian argument to satisfy the first condition. For the
second condition, he observes that the U.S. Senate's interpretation of the U.N.
Convention Against Torture (CAT) does not plainly exclude the necessity
defense, because the Senate explicitly refused to condemn torture in all possible
circumstances. (The original CAT language, in contrast, does not permit a
necessity defense.)
But Allhoff is not out of the woods yet. The most strained aspect of his
legal argument is his attempt to show that, the Model Penal Code aside, the
federal government would actually adopt the necessity defense to excuse
torture. This question poses considerable difficulty for Allhoff, because there is
no federal statute to support the necessity defense. Allhoff must somehow
bridge the gap between the Senate's refusal to categorically renounce the
necessity defense and the absence of any actual legislation adopting it.
In an attempt to overcome this concern, Allhoff discusses a handful of
Supreme Court cases. He points out that in United States v. Bailey and
Baender v. Barnett,4 for example, the Court does not expressly reject a
necessity defense (pp. 190-91). However, Allhoff does not offer a single federal
1. For another critical discussion of this hypothetical, see Michael Davis, The Moral
Justifiability of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment, 19 INT'L J. APPLIED PHIL.
161 (2005).
2. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1962).
3. 444 U.S. 394 (1980).
4. 255 U.S. 224 (1921).
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court case that endorses the necessity defense. A philosopher as methodical as
Allhoff should recognize the weakness of arguing for a positive proposition by
noting the lack of negation.
Terrorism, Ticking Time-Bombs, and Torture is at its best when even-
handedly assessing the merits of arguments for and against torture. For readers
interested in reviewing the state of the debate thus far, there are few treatments
more thorough or balanced. However, for those interested in breaking new
ground, Allhoff's book is somewhat disappointing. Allhoff does not extend his
discussion beyond variants of the "ticking time-bomb" scenario nor does he
propose a convincing new legal theory to defend torturers.
Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law Beyond Borders. By Paul
Schiff Berman. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Pp.
xii, 344. Price: $99.00 (Hardback). Reviewed by Philipp Kotlaba.
Suppose a foreign tribunal seeks to enforce an action against an American
company whose behavior would otherwise be deemed not only legal, but also
explicitly protected by the U.S. Constitution. A French court's battle in 2000 to
block access to Yahoo!-an American-owned website-from users in Europe,
on account of Yahoo!'s hosting Nazi and Holocaust-denial materials, is but one
of many examples of normative clashes sparked by the transnational interaction
of incongruent legal regimes. Was the French court justified in asserting
jurisdiction? What does the answer to this question say about the
appropriateness of territorially determined sovereignty in an era of
transnational law?
These questions grapple with the fundamental problems globalization
poses for the view that the nation-state is the dominant actor in international
relations. In Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law Beyond Borders,
Paul Schiff Berman confronts this issue directly. He disputes the nation-state's
role as the exclusive or even dominant source of legal authority. Berman offers,
instead, a novel procedural framework for reconciling and resolving the
tensions posed by overlapping and often competing sources of law in the
transnational arena.
For Berman, territorial jurisdiction-that is, an assumption of unitary
systems of law grounded within the physical borders of nation-states-is
obsolete in a globalized world. Individuals today, he argues, are influenced and
guided by a dizzying array of overlapping, often contradictory systems of
governance. Some may adhere to a traditional conception of law. But a world
of "normative communities" (p. 8), entirely distinct from legal regimes, lies just
beneath the surface of our assumptions about what constitutes "real" law and
what governs our everyday behavior. Accordingly, Berman first discredits
previous jurisdictional frameworks as ineffective, then proposes an alternative
system that better corresponds to today's realities. In doing so, he offers a
chance of managing-if not always reconciling-the conflicts created by
jurisdictional overlap.
Berman's task in the two introductory chapters is to expose the
dissonance between established doctrines of jurisdiction and the changed
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realities that render the former not only impracticable, but also normatively
undesirable. Thanks to huge transformations in communications technologies,
ease of transportation, and increased mobility of capital, exclusive jurisdiction
is no longer a useful paradigm within which to interpret law. Multiple legal
codes within and among states, as well as increasingly nonstate regimes-
including nongovernmental actors, alternative-dispute-resolution tribunals,
religious codes, and cultural customs-play significant roles in shaping the
legal environment.
In Part I, Berman deconstructs legal scholars' failures to adequately
respond to the fundamental changes facing law in a globalized world. Chapter
Three addresses the failings of what Berman calls "sovereigntist territorialism"
(p. 63), the notion that nation-states exercise exclusive jurisdiction over their
sphere of influence, taking measures, if necessary, to keep out foreign
influences. Berman singles out Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner's The Limits of
International Laws for criticism of what he sees as the territorialist mindset's
propensity for falsely constructing a nation-state as a single-minded and
rational actor whose decisions remain untouched by outside, nonstate norms. If
ever were was the case, Berman argues that "the idea that a state could have a
single interest," in light of today's competing interests within government and
the forces applying pressure from the outside, "is simply unfathomable" (p. 99).
Berman condemns sovereigntist territoriality as both pragmatically
unworkable and normatively objectionable. By treating certain norms-the vast
majority, if we are to include all but those stemming from institutionalized,
jurisdictional organs administered directly by the state-as "outside" and
therefore irrelevant, decisionmakers automatically and needlessly privilege the
values of one "imagined community," 6 the domestic nation-state, above all
others (pp. 90-92). For example, in Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo
Ayuntamiento de Barcelona,7  a Spanish cyber-squatter registered
"barcelona.com" and transferred the registration to an American shell
company, which the squatter claimed had been set up for financing reasons. As
a result, U.S. courts adjudicated the resultant trademark action brought by the
City of Barcelona. The cyber-squatter ultimately prevailed when the court
disregarded Spanish law and practices-which would have favored the city's
claim-and used the shell company's place of registration as grounds for
appl ing the domestic Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act' (pp. 280-.
82). This example demonstrates how territoriality fails to adequately account
for parties' "actual community affiliations" (p. 284). It also, ironically, fails to
reflect the interests of nation-states in being good-faith partners in the
"interlocking international network" of domestic regulatory regimes (p. 284).
5. JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).
6. Berman relies heavily on BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS
ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (rev. ed. 2006) for the concept of nation-states as
imagined communities.
7. 330 F.3d 617 (4th Cir. 2003).
8. Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 8131 (Supp. 112008).
9. 330 F.3d at 628.
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Moreover, Berman argues that this positivist and often provincial vision
of the law deprives decisionmakers of legitimacy and blinds them to how
alternative international, transnational, and nonstate legal norms do in fact
influence and shape pre-existing doctrine.10 "Naturalizing" jurisdiction
geographically thus obscures "the constructed nature of the enterprise ... from
analytical purview" (p. 67).
Yet, in Berman's analysis, the "international law triumphalism" of
universalists, who might unhesitatingly embrace one uniform world law and do
away with the nation-state altogether, is equally mistaken. Universalism, as the
author frames it in Chapter 4, is based on the premise that individuals are
fundamentally alike despite differences in culture and background. Whereas
territorialists reify and exclude the "other," universalists assume the other "is
not truly other at all" (p. 129). In response to cultural female mutilation
practices in Africa, for instance, universalists might insist on the imposition of
contravening and supposedly universal human rights values. This perspective
manages competing norms by erasing difference, embracing familiarity, and
codifying a regime of international law that embodies and enforces shared
norms among cultures. The intent of universalism may be admirable. Berman,
however, dismisses such harmonization as neither feasible, since each of us has
multiple community affiliations and allegiances not readily rejected (p. 136),
nor appealing, since erasing diversity would exaggerate power asymmetries and
serve to marginalize less powerful groups (p. 131).
Accordingly, an open discussion and evaluation of the diverse sources of
legal and extra-legal norms-for Berman, a meaningless distinction-cannot
proceed either when territorial sovereigntists exclude the alien or when
universalists assume the alien away. Berman dedicates the remainder of his
work, Parts III and IV, to presenting what he terms "cosmopolitan pluralism,"
an alternative theoretical lens that allows decisionmakers to acknowledge,
manage, and resolve tensions between competing legal norms.
Historically, legal pluralism was associated with either European
colonialism, in which imperial law necessarily interacted with indigenous legal
systems, or the interactions between canon law and secular state law (p. 13).
Berman's cosmopolitan pluralism extends this line of thinking to the
unprecedented interactions and conflicts between entirely distinct legal
regimes. In this context, he endorses eight common mechanisms as "means for
managing" pluralism: "dialectical legal interactions, margins of appreciation,
limited autonomy regimes, subsidiarity schemes, hybrid participation
arrangements, mutual recognition regimes, safe harbor agreements, and regime
interaction" (p. 152). In the French Yahoo! case, for instance, a cosmopolitan
pluralist approach would use a conditional "mutual recognition regime,"
10. Examples of the intrastate effects of nonstate norms include the process by which the
Nuremberg trials developed the concept of crimes against humanity (p. 106) and the Bush
Administration's endorsement of the Security Council's referral of the Darfur crisis in Sudan to the
International Criminal Court (ICC), despite its initial opposition to the creation of the ICC just a few
years earlier (p. 126).
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whereby courts recognize foreign laws and standards in certain circumstances
so long as those outside norms are "compatible" with local ones (p. 179).
The same would hold true for interactions with nonstate actors. State
actors might extend to nonstate actors a margin of appreciation, for example, to
allow health officials to carve out an exception to an international DDT ban for
the purposes of combating malaria (p. 185). Here, state decisionmakers
determined that such an exception was compelling, sufficiently narrow, and
compatible with the desire to reduce DDT's environmental pollution, and
therefore allowed its use subject to review from an independent third party, the
World Health Organization. Likewise, a state adhering to a cosmopolitan
pluralist framework might defer to an indigenous tribe's insistence on using
peyote in religious ceremonies, reasoning that the religious norm justifies
deference and is not incompatible with the law's broader desire to prevent the
spread of controlled substances.
Cosmopolitan pluralism does not demand this kind of accomodation
under all circumstances. In some cases, the normative clash might be too great
to tolerate hybridity under any of Berman's eight criteria. In Bob Jones
University v. United States"-in which the Supreme Court held that the IRS
could withhold a tax exemption from Bob Jones University due to its
prohibition on interracial dating-Berman assures readers that a cosmopolitan
pluralist approach would still compel the Court to unambiguously articulate its
profound normative commitment to anti-racism by rejecting the university's
legal argument and the alternative norm it represented, rather than find for the
university on a technicality (pp. 287-90).
In short, Berman calls for creating space for decisionmakers to evaluate
their constituents' legal and nonlegal governing norms and then to choose for
themselves which combination of principles is best suited to meet the specific
needs of the situation. This approach neither dictates outcomes nor guarantees
success, but offers a procedure that is more likely to lead to satisfactory results
than either territorial sovereigntism or universalism. If we are forced to
acknowledge the hybridity of systems governing our everyday lives, Berman
reasons, at a minimum we must foster a transparent dialogue about which
foreign values we can accept and which represent such an affront to our native
norms that the state must use its coercive monopoly to reject them.
Berman's work is ambitious and eloquently presented but not without its
faults. Although understandable, the way in which Berman constructs the two
adversarial schools of thought in Part I is somewhat dubious. Casting his
cosmopolitan pluralism in stark opposition to territorial sovereigntism and
universalism is helpful for demonstrating the need for a framework more
capable of mediating between overlapping legal norms. Unfortunately, the
dichotomy is neither particularly accurate nor reflective of the actual diversity
of approaches to the problems of law and globalization that his thesis is
designed to address.
I1. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
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More importantly, most of the examples Berman offers to illustrate the
problem of conflicting legal systems are interstate ones, rather than conflicts
between entirely distinct, nonstate systems of governance. The author's perhaps
misplaced focus on state law robs Berman's thesis of some of its force, as it is
all too easy for the reader to continue to adhere to the state-oriented
jurisprudential outlook of which the author presumably wishes to rid him.
Although Berman's arguments themselves are robust, too much of his book
focuses on all-too-familiar interstate conflict, giving only limited attention to
conflicts among nonstate legal norms that are the raison d'dtre for his thesis.
Finally, Berman's positive suggestions are couched almost exclusively in
the language of procedure, not substance. However, by the time the reader
finishes the book's final sections, the question naturally arises as to what
metrics one might use in the actual exercise of the eight "mechanisms for
managing pluralism" (p. 152). For instance, at what point does our margin for
appreciation of minority legal norms expire? Additionally, even procedure,
presumably neutral on its face, masks hidden value judgments that impact the
outcomes they dictate. Whatever means one uses to evaluate competing
systems of law will necessarily also influence the way in which the laws are
reconciled. Berman's thesis might have been strengthened if it had included
corrective devices for maintaining a neutral space for resolving this legal
cacophony.
Nevertheless, what does fall within the scope of Global Legal Pluralism
is convincing, comprehensive, and remarkably accessible. The reader comes
away with an enhanced appreciation for the difficulties created when starkly
different normative assumptions come into contact with one another and
compete for primacy in different jurisdictions. This is a lucid introduction to
the subject and a robust call for a more nuanced understanding of the
transnational legal world in which we live. After reading Berman's book,
readers should feel more empowered to navigate this terrain.
The New Continentalism: Energy and Twenty-First-Century Eurasian
Geopolitics. By Kent E. Calder. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
2012. Pp. xxxiv, 377. Price: $35.00 (Paperback). Reviewed by Jordan
Chandler Hirsch.
Kent Calder's new book, The New Continentalism: Energy and Twenty-
First-Century Eurasian Geopolitics, claims to "bring geography back into
international political analysis" (pp. xxvii-xxviii). Despite commentators such
as Thomas Friedman "[telling] us confidently that 'the world is flat,"' Calder
argues, "remarkably little attention has been given to the impact of location"
(pp. 15-16). He promises to demonstrate that geography retains special utility
by exploring the rebirth of the Silk Road through energy trade.
Calder's work joins a burgeoning genre of books dedicated to resurrecting
geography. The trend began fifteen years ago with Jared Diamond's Guns,
Germs, and Steel (1997) and has continued with works such as Parag Khanna's
The Second World (2008), Harm de Blij's Why Geography Matters (2005), and
Robert Kaplan's The Revenge of Geography (2012). Those books remind
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readers that despite the borderless communication, travel, and trade of the post-
Cold War era, the world has not escaped the atlas. Instead, geography, like
gravity, is pulling us back into a time when nations mustered battleships and
cavalry in a Risk-like struggle for plots and passes. In arguing that geography,
through its impact on the energy trade, has reunited the East to a degree not
seen "since the arrival of Vasco da Gama at Calicut in 1498," Calder sprinkles
this familiar narrative of ancient spices with modem crude (p. 29). The result is
sometimes enchanting, but mostly a mirage.
Calder, a professor at Johns Hopkins University, argues that Eurasia-
which he defines as "all the nations of the Asian continent, plus the territory of
the former Soviet Union" (p. 305)-is returning to the world of the Silk Road.
That route once tied Eastern China to the Mediterranean coast through
foodstuffs and fabrics. But today, according to Calder, "energy is to the New
Silk Road what silk was to its ancestors" (p. 1). In the endnotes, he explains
that his Silk Road is not a "precise geographical expression" but a "figurative
expression" used "interchangeably" with Eurasia-an early sign of his
tendency to blur the map with exoticism (p. 306 n.10).
Along this metaphorical route, Calder argues, energy is siphoning nations
from their previous alignments into a new continental order. As East Asian
consumers grow hungrier for fuel, the Russian and West Asian producers next
door-who claim over sixty percent of the world's proven oil and gas
reserves-happily provide it (p. 31). Asia's share of Middle Eastern energy
exports, he notes, has risen from twenty percent in 1980 to nearly half by 2010.
In fact, the Middle East now "exports substantially more to East Asia than to
Europe or America" (p. 6). The Middle East and the rest of Eurasia are, in
Calder's words, "fated to be enmeshed in an ever-tightening mutual energy
embrace" (p. 2) that will have "momentous, potentially disturbing, implications
for all the world" (p. 11).
In hailing a "New Silk Road," Calder adopts the latest in diplomatic
slang. Parag Khanna, a star among the cosmopolitan elite who frequents global
gatherings such as the Davos World Economic Forum, recently pronounced the
advent of a "rapidly integrating Eurasian super-continent" converging around a
New Silk Road "made of iron" and stretching "from Scotland to Singapore."l 2
Governments are using the same language. The U.S. State Department has a
"New Silk Road" initiative calling for a regional network of economic and
transit connections.13 And Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao recently declared that
"the ancient Silk Road has regained its past vigor and vitality."l 4
12. Parag Khanna, The New Silk Road Is Made of Iron-and Stretches from Scotland to
Singapore, QUARTZ, Sept. 30, 2012, http://qz.com/6140/the-new-silk-road-is-made-of-iron-and-stretches
-from-scotland-to-singapore.
13. Robert D. Hormats, Under Sec'y for Econ., Energy & Agric. Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State,
The United States' "New Silk Road" Strategy: What Is It? Where Is It Headed?, Address to the SAIS
Central Asia-Caucusus Institute and CSIS Forum (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.state.gov/e/rls/rrnk
/2011/174800.htm.
14. Robert Olsen, Arabia-Asia: China Builds New Silk Road, But Is the Middle East Ready?,
FoRBES, Oct. 21, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertolsen/2012/10/21/arabia-asia-china-builds
-new-silk-road-but-is-the-middle-east-ready.
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Calder demonstrates that such rhetoric may be more than just TED Talk
fodder. The rationale behind growing Eurasian interdependence, he argues, is
both commercial and geographic: the major consumers and producers of
hydrocarbons share an economic need and have "a geographically ordained
complementarity that cannot be ignored" (p. 197). While Eurasian countries
trade easily over traditional ocean routes, major consumers would rather
circumvent the "strategic uncertain[ties]" posed by terrorism, piracy, and, in
China's case, the U.S. Navy (p. 35). And, as Calder documents, they are
already working toward that goal. Oil and gas pipelines now flow into China
from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, while others snake from the Caspian Sea
to the Mediterranean (pp. 36-37). Eurasian states have boosted traditional
seafaring trade as well. The United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Qatar each ship
over eighty percent of their oil to Asian markets (p. 105). Eighty percent of
Iran's hydrocarbon exports flow to China, Japan, India, and South Korea (pp.
81-82). And over three times as much oil from Saudi Arabia travels to Asia as
to the United States (p. 138).
This energy commerce, Calder argues, has strengthened a variety of other
ties among Eurasian nations. To begin with, it has improved overall trade.
"[T]he rate of increase in virtually all major bilateral intra-Asian trade
relationships," Calder writes, "has been more rapid over the past decade than
that of world trade in general" (p. 206). China and India have boosted trade
with central Eurasian states such as Iran and Kazakhstan. In 2010, Russia
supplied nearly $2.9 billion in weaponry to India and over $400 million to
China (p. 209). Rising commerce has in turn led to a proliferation of
multilateral organizations. These bodies, from the Collective Security Treaty
Organization to the Eurasian Economic Community and the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, have coordinated efforts against drug trafficking and
terrorism (p. 225). Such connections, Calder meticulously demonstrates, have
made Eurasia "a more interactive . .. and cohesive continent" (p. 245).
The question is what this convergence means for the future of Eurasia.
Will its bonds remain solely economic? Or will it cohere into some kind of
political force? In searching for an answer, Calder discards his sober analysis
for romantic flair. He draws inspiration from the legacies of American naval
strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan and British geographer Halford Mackinder.
Mahan emphasized the importance of naval strength, arguing that land powers
such as imperial Russia were unavoidably dominant in northern Asia but that
sea powers dominated below the thirtieth parallel (p. 17). Mackinder,
meanwhile, "stressed the strategic centrality of the vast Eurasian heartland" as a
"geographical pivot" (pp. 17-18). "Who rules the Heartland controls the World-
Island," Mackinder once said, "and who rules the World-Island commands the
World" (p. 18).
The prose of this chess-piece diplomacy seems anachronistic at best, but
Calder succumbs to it often. The Silk Road, in his words, "snakes among
teeming masses of the world's most numerous and aspiring energy consumers"
and constitutes a "figurative highway, bounded by geography and animated by
the still-living shadows of a venerable 2,000-year history" (pp. 1, 100). Eurasia
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is becoming "a vast interactive political-economic entity" (p. 13). The Middle
East and Asia are the "two great pillars of the pre-Columbian world" (p. 5).
Iran represents the "Land of the Two Seas" astride the Caspian and the Persian
Gulf (p. 32). Saudi Arabia adopts a "Look East" policy while India pursues
"Look West" (p. 276). Section and chapter titles hail "The Unavoidable
Geoeconomic Attractions of Iran" (p. 43) and "Emerging Ententes Amid
Complex Continentalism" (p. 199).
The book's reliance on what Calder calls the "critical-juncture
framework" underscores his affinity for the drama of the Great Game (p. 49).
He defines a critical juncture as "a historical decision point at which there are
distinct alternative paths to the future" (p. 53) in which "individual decision-
making ... profoundly shapes the ultimate institutional product" (p. 49).
According to Calder, these moments of crisis necessitate "decisions and
actions" by world leaders that change the status quo (p. 54). Six such junctures,
in Calder's view, have freed the forces of energy economics, setting "powerful
forces ... in motion on both the demand and supply sides of the Old World
energy equation" (p. 113): the 1973 Arab oil embargo, China's Four
Modernizations, the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Indian economic reforms of
the early 1990s, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the rise of Vladimir Putin
(p. 58).
For Calder, these cataclysmic events occurred at the level of high politics,
with world-historical figures acting in crisis and unlocking the natural course of
Eurasia's geopolitical destiny. Here and elsewhere, Calder flirts with the notion
that economic integration will inevitably lead to political convergence. Eurasia,
he argues, is headed toward "continentalism," with countries adopting "social
and economic policies that encourage and advance economic and political
integration of territorially contiguous nations on a continental scale" (p. xxviii).
"At a minimum," Calder writes, Eurasian countries "are trying to create an
autonomous space ... where American superpower is not determining" (p.
246). The "age-old tyranny of location" (p. 46) continues in the energy sphere,
"leading us gradually toward an intra-Eurasian interdependence that ... has
sobering future implications for international affairs" (p. 266).
Yet Calder's survey of possible "ententes" between Eurasian powers is
highly speculative. In one instance, he contemplates the idea of a grand
strategic alliance between China, India, and Russia, which together "occup[y]
the bulk of Mackinder's 'world island' at the epicenter of human civilization"
(p. 213). He provides little evidence of shared interest in such an alignment and
hardly mentions the many obstacles in its path. In another, he essentially
conjures up the notion of a transnational natural gas grid, arguing that a
"powerful rationale" exists for such a project but offering no indication that
Eurasian countries have considered it (p. 229). The trade that does exist may
subside as new technologies, such as bioenergy, fracking, and horizontal
drilling, spearhead an energy revolution beyond Eurasia. This past November,
for example, the International Energy Agency predicted that by 2020, the
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United States would surpass Saudi Arabia as the world's largest oil producer.' 5
Calder is right to note that post-Cold War technological evangelism has
diminished appreciation for "geography and physical circumstance" (p. 26). In
setting out to correct that imbalance, however, he overcompensates, too easily
neglecting how innovation can alter the map.
Perhaps for that reason, Calder makes all the necessary caveats to avoid
being trapped, Jumanji-like, in his board game. He concedes that these
emerging relationships "by no means create. . . a cohesive Eurasian economic,
political, or geostrategic entity" (p. 200). Thus far, he writes, "trade and finance
have not been principal drivers of political integration between the east and
west of Asia" (p. 245). "Divisive rivalries," meanwhile, "continue to exist" (p.
248). Even so, the overall tone of the book is one of geopolitical giddiness:
pipelines laid here, high-speed railways constructed there, all pathways to
Eurasian unity. The result is a heady brew of Hegel and geography.
In the end, Calder resorts to the Silk Road because his case for Eurasian
continentalism cannot sustain itself without some imagination. The image of
the ancient path encourages readers to view Eurasia as reverting to some kind
of natural order in which geography controls the fate of nations. Yet while trade
may reduce violence, it does not necessarily lead to political cooperation. The
countries of Eurasia divide along many lines besides borders, and they are
defined by more than their oil fields and mountaintops. Maps, in the end, can
be flat, too.
Advancing the Rule of Law Abroad: Next Generation Reform. By Rachel
Kleinfeld. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 2012. Pp. xi, 281. Price: $19.95 (Paperback). Reviewed by
Jasmeet K. Ahuja.
Every year, the U.S. government sends millions of dollars overseas to
promote democratic governance and respect for human rights, a constellation of
international programs and commitments called rule-of-law reform. But this
funding comes with its share of controversy. Critics often brand rule-of-law
reform as a money-sink and contend that it should be abandoned (pp. 5-6). That
rule-of-law reform is often wholly ineffective is an open secret in Washington.
As a result, proponents turn to justifying the programs on philosophical
grounds rather than practical ones. Even if rule-of-law reform is not perfect,
they argue, its normative goal is worthy of U.S. investment: every nation has a
right io a functioning government that respects the rule of law. In other words,
rule-of-law reform is often good policy even if sometimes bad politics. For
those of us rooting for rule-of-law reform's success despite the inadequacies of
our "first-generation" efforts, Rachel Kleinfeld's second book, Advancing the
Rule of Law Abroad: Next Generation Reform, offers a refreshing new take.
15. Ronald D. White & Tiffany Hsu, U.S. To Become World's Largest Oil Producer by 2020,




Not only can rule-of-law reform itself be reformed, but doing so may not be as
onerous as one might expect.
Kleinfeld's approach is as simple as it is reasonable. She argues that rule-
of-law reformers have become too myopically focused on means over ends. We
need to push the reset button by asking ourselves: What are "the goals that led
[reformers] to undertake rule-of-law reform in the first place?" (p. 13). In
answering this question, Kleinfeld artfully guides the reader on a journey
through the history of rule-of-law reform and the deficiencies in current rule-
of-law efforts, before ultimately laying out a blueprint for "second-generation"
rule-of-law reform.
Kleinfeld begins by explaining that, given our foreign policy ideals, rule
of law is often described as a top priority. When our neighbors, allies, and
friends are governed transparently and impartially, the United States benefits-
or so the argument goes. Though Kleinfeld acknowledges that such a position
often reeks of American self-indulgence and, worse, cultural imperialism, 16 she
is logical in her dismissal: "[T]he United States is surely going to continue to
engage in efforts to build the rule of law in other countries .. . .The realistic
choices are to try to do this better, or to do it worse" (p. 77). On the one hand,
Kleinfeld acknowledges that justifying rule-of-law reform on these grounds
smacks of a certain kind of realpolitik, but she reasons that it need not be a
zero-sum game. When implemented correctly, rule-of-law reform should
simultaneously improve the United States' global position and benefit local
populations. Rule-of-law reform, in other words, ought to improve "[our] own
security, [our] desire to spread human rights and democracy, and [our interests
in] economic development abroad" (p. 56).
Moreover, Kleinfeld understands that these three goals-though
sometimes overlapping-can often be at odds. For example, some U.S.
companies might prefer to pay bribes to operate overseas if it means they can
avoid a country's unpredictable regulatory system. In that case, U.S. efforts to
curb corruption might impede America's economic self-interest. Similarly,
Kleinfeld notes that spreading the rule of law can sometimes make it more
difficult for the United States to influence the governance of other nations. For
example, "the desire for security against the communist threat clashed with
growing concerns about human rights abuses caused by the 'death squads'
trained by the United States" (p. 40). Thus, even when effective, rule-of-law
reform can be a mixed bag.
Kleinfeld makes the case that successful rule-of-law reform requires
immediate attention to "laws, institutions, power structure, and cultural norms"
(p. 107) before reform programs are implemented, not later, as is often the case
with current, first-generation reform efforts. These problems-what one might
16. Critics of rule-of-law reform and U.S. foreign aid often argue that such programs are
focused more on U.S. interests than on the interests of the target nation. For example, in the heat of the
2008 Congressional debates over aid to Pakistan, Pakistanis took to the streets, marching that Pakistan
and not the U.S. government should decide what programs are funded. More problematic, the mere idea
that the United States thinks another country can benefit from U.S. aid rubs some as arrogant: who is to
say that U.S. values are the best values?
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call "programmatic deficiencies" 17 -can be overcome if rule-of-law reformers
define their goals early on and appreciate the potential secondary and tertiary
effects of their actions. In other words, reformers need to be aware that in
moving toward one goal, we might be taking steps backwards from another. To
fully grasp the interaction among laws, institutions, power structures, and
cultural norms, Kleinfeld creates a new taxonomy for thinking about rule-of-
law-reform with four primary categories: (1) top-down reforms (funding and
technical assistance to rule-of-law institutions); (2) bottom-up reforms (funding
and technical assistance to civil society groups); (3) diplomacy (pressure to
force the government to institute change); and (4) enmeshment (pressure and
socialization via enmeshing a country in rule-of-law norms) (pp. 150-5 1).
This novel way of thinking about our approaches to rule-of-law reform
not only brings to light the disproportionate role that top-down reforms have
played in first-generation efforts, but also underscores the holes in current U.S.
reform programs. By ignoring the significant sway of civil society groups and
the influence of enmeshment in affecting rule of law, for example, current
efforts to reform rule of law are tantamount to showing up to a fight with one
hand tied behind your back. More significantly-as Kleinfeld discusses in
detail-first-generation reform too often fails to account for the sheer number
of U.S. governmental agencies that now operate in the development
community. This is a fact wholly underappreciated in today's rule-of-law
reform debate. While the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) is still the titular figurehead of the U.S government's rule-of-law
reform efforts abroad, the Department of Defense (DOD) and other agencies
now play a disproportionate role. Kleinfeld deserves kudos for taking the
Pentagon to task for the fact that its programs often undermine USAID's rule-
of-law efforts.
Having served as a staffer on the House Committee on Foreign Affairs-
and having seen the rule-of-law tempest from the inside-I can say that this is a
bigger problem than even Kleinfeld argues. The reason why USAID so often
fails is because it is underresourced. Congress's penchant for decreasing
USAID funding is matched only by its tendency to concomitantly increase the
Pentagon's budget for "humanitarian" initiatives. This exacerbates
programmatic deficiencies because programs are implemented poorly in order
to serve DOD's goals, rather than rule-of-law goals.' 8 Moreover, the cutbacks
in USAID's funding create a vicious cycle: USAID's programs are ineffective
because USAID programs are underfunded-but USAID programs are
underfunded because Congress sees them as ineffective. The failure to
appreciate the need for a steady hand in reform is a significant "political
constraint"-as I call it-on current reform efforts.
Rule-of-law reform efforts ultimately suffer at the hands of the beast that
is U.S. bureaucracy-which itself is a product of an equally dysfunctional U.S.
17. This term is mine, rather than Kleinfeld's.
18. For example, just as U.S. rule-of-law reformers began supporting local, Romanian civil
society groups determined to unseat their communist-inspired government, the DOD began building
military bases across Romania, flushing its leadership with money (pp. 147-48).
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Congress. From my experiences in both the executive and legislative branches,
I am acutely aware of the difficulties of working with a Congress ever hungry
for results. Although it plays only an ancillary role in foreign policy and rule-
of-law reform,19 Congress nonetheless demands that all agencies, including
USAID, provide timely reports on the success of each of their programs. After
all, members of Congress-who are up for election every two years-need to
be able to explain to their constituents why millions of dollars are spent
overseas to fight crime when the crime rates in their own districts often remain
high.
This creates the need for performance metrics: quantitative measurements
signaling the success or failure of particular practices. The problem with these
metrics, however, is that it is nearly impossible to measure easily or quickly-
at least, quickly enough for the electoral cycle-the safety of a particular city or
how U.S. funding has improved that safety. As Kleinfeld explains, what we
need to do is to count the number of murders and violent crimes over time, but,
instead, we count the number of officers we graduate from the police
academies we have created: it is simply quicker and easier for us (p. 184). The
same problem arises in the context of our war in Afghanistan. With the 2014
withdrawal deadline looming, some policymakers tend to want to measure
success in Afghanistan not by asking whether the Afghan government is ready
to manage its own security but instead by counting the number of Afghanistan
National Security Forces we have trained.20
Rule-of-law reform is also beholden to Congress's budget cycle. When
the leader of a particular country begins shooting its citizens or is deposed by
the military, USAID and the State Department are often caught like a deer in
headlights-they simply don't have the financial agility to move around large
pots of money quickly enough to affect change on the ground. Since Congress
authorizes and then appropriates funding a year in advance for administrative
agencies, rule-of-law reform must often wait several months to receive funding
and begin work. This, understandably, also inhibits effective rule-of-law
reform.
Tackling political constraints is an even greater challenge than tackling
programmatic deficiencies, since political constraints are embedded in the way
that Congress negotiates and passes legislation. Kleinfeld readily acknowledges
19. Arguably, this can be attributed to the fact that it is easier for Congress to abdicate
responsibility, do nothing, and then blame the Executive branch and because the Executive would rather
control all foreign affairs. See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, The President's Authority over Foreign Affairs:
An Executive Branch Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 527, 531-35 (1999) (discussing the Executive
Branch's justification and motivation for exercising authority over foreign affairs).
20. See, e.g., Ahmad Majidyar, A Major Setback in Afghanistan, REALCLEARPOLITICS, Sept.
19, 2012, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/2012/09/19/a major setback inafghanistan_290649.html
("More than 150,000 additional soldiers and policemen have been added, and the ANSF is currently
leading more than 50% of operations across the country."); Rod Nordland, Afghan Army's Turnover
Threatens U.S. Strategy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/16/world/asia/afghan
-armys-high-tumover-clouds-us-exit-plan.html ("Now at ... 195,000 soldiers, the Afghan Army. .. has
to replace a third of its entire force every year . . .. The attrition strikes at the core of America's exit
strategy in Afghanistan: to build an Afghan National Army that can take over the war and allow the
United States and NATO forces to withdraw by the end of 2014.").
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this 800-pound gorilla (pp. 200, 220), but it is ultimately beyond the scope of
her study, which focuses on the serious programmatic issues facing rule-of-law
reform rather than on the fundamentally political ones.
To overcome programmatic deficiencies and improve the efficacy of rule-
of-law reform, Kleinfeld recommends a straightforward and methodical
second-generation approach: Step one, start with the problem; step two,
determine the institutional, political, and cultural components of the problem;
step three, locate opposition and support; step four, determine evaluation
targets and measurement goals; and step five, design the reform program. (pp.
186-202). In noting that a second-generation reformer must "start with the
problem," Kleinfeld reminds law-reform practitioners that today's efforts are
often doomed to fail before they even begin. For example, rather than asking
what the problem is, local USAID implementers often try to implement cookie-
cutter reforms more grounded in Washington's "interest of the week" than a
country's actual needs. Standardized solutions and, worse, mirror images of
programs and policies that have succeeded in the United States are not always
effective means of rule-of-law reform elsewhere, Kleinfeld points out (pp. 185-
87).
Rather, the key to second-generation reform is an acknowledgment that
every country is-by definition-different. Every country has its own unique
politics and social norms. In thinking about the needs of the nation in which
they seek to operate, second-generation rule-of-law reformers must identify the
institutional, political, and cultural components of the rule-of-law problems it
faces. Is a particular civil society group to blame? Success and failure for any
program, but particularly for rule-of-law reform, depends on stakeholder
interests. If all of the in-country stakeholders are opposed to an effort, the effort
is doomed to fail. Further, a program designer must determine whether the
problem it is addressing is already getting better or worse. This is crucially
important, Kleinfeld reasons, because it allows the program manager to decide
how to evaluate a program's success before the program is designed: that is, to
"measure the end, not the program, which is the means" (p. 199).
Kleinfeld closes by recommending that program designers look beyond
the four corners of their offices to all of the tools of the U.S. government. Is
USAID best equipped to handle this project or should the Pentagon be
involved? Integrating interagency rule-of-law reform efforts is crucially
important; the U.S. government all too often sends mixed messages. Given that
uniformity and equality is essential to the rule of law, hypocrisy in our rule-of-
law reform efforts is counterproductive.
The poignancy of Kleinfeld's argument ultimately rests in its simplicity.
Kleinfeld's recommendations are neither esoteric nor unreasonable. And, yet,
efforts to improve rule-of-law reform continue to lag. Advancing the Rule of
Law Abroad is a fascinating and easy read, a wonderful effort to demystify U.S.
rule-of-law reform and perhaps even take it mainstream. The book is a must-
read for Congress and foreign-aid practitioners alike. If the U.S. government is
ever going to fix our rule-of-law efforts, Kleinfeld's insightful
recommendations provide a helpful start.
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Illegal Peace in Africa: An Inquiry into the Legality of Power Sharing with
Warlords, Rebels, and Junta. By Jeremy I. Levitt. New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press, 2012. Pp. xi, 301. Price: $99.00
(Hardcover). Reviewed by Rachel Dempsey.
On December 24, 1989, a group of rebels led by Charles Taylor invaded
Liberia and overthrew the military rule of President Samuel Doe, marking the
beginning of the Liberian Civil War. In March 1991, in neighboring Sierra
Leone, a rebel group that called itself the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
began attacking diamond-rich villages in the east, kicking off a civil war that
would ravage the country for the next decade. Just to the north, the citizens of
Guinea-Bissau were living through a series of coups that exploded into armed
conflict in 1998 with the overthrow of democratically elected President
Bernardo Nino Viera.
More than two decades into the earliest conflict, Liberia, Sierra Leone,
and Guinea-Bissau are still struggling to forge a sustainable peace. In Illegal
Peace in Africa: An Inquiry into the Legality of Power Sharing with Warlords,
Rebels, and Junta, Jeremy I. Levitt examines the power-sharing agreements
that form the basis for peacemaking efforts in all three countries. These
agreements generally involve "transitional political power sharing between
contesting groups (warlords, rebels, and junta) and democratically constituted
governments for a fixed and impermanent period of time, until elections take
place" (p. I n.1).
Challenging the prevailing status quo, Levitt contends that Liberia's 2003
Accra Agreement, Sierra Leone's 1999 Lom6 Agreement, and Guinea-Bissau's
1998 Abuja Agreement are all fundamentally illegal and therefore invalid. (pp.
120-21, 144, 166). He takes issue with the popular wisdom of political
scientists and policymakers for whom power sharing has emerged as the
mechanism of choice for attempting to rebuild conflict-torn African states.
According to Levitt, no peace built on a foundation that violates domestic and
international law can last. Levitt makes a convincing argument that extra-
constitutional peace built on the supposition "that warlords can become
democrats once they are sanctioned with state authority" will be inherently
fragile and easily broken (p. 18). Unsettlingly, however, he fails to come up
with a coherent alternative.
The book can be informally divided into three sections. The first section
introduces Levitt's proposed "neo-Kadeshian" framework for a legal peace,
tracing the historical and normative arguments for and against power sharing
while outlining the contours of a proposed new model for post-conflict
rebuilding. The next section looks at how power-sharing arrangements emerged
and were enacted in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau. The final
section examines the developments in West Africa in the aftermath of the
Accra, Lom6, and Abuja accords, and offers potential alternatives to power
sharing as currently understood.
In the first section, Levitt argues that political scientists have
systematically overlooked the role of both national and international law in
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peacemaking in favor of political expediency. His central premise is that this
compromises the peace this practice seeks to create by flouting international
obligations to hold human rights violators accountable for their crimes and by
ignoring national constitutional checks and balances intended to control and
legitimize government.
Instead of the largely political approach that dominates the current norm
of conflict resolution, Levitt proposes a neo-Kadeshian model (NKM) of
analysis that uses the 3000-year-old Treaty of Kadesh as a framework for
crafting a legal peace. The Treaty of Kadesh (1280 B.C.) incorporated "three
ancient sources of international law": international conventions, international
custom, and general principles of law (p. 9). In modem Africa, the NKM would
rely upon domestic and regional legal norms as well as international institutions
including the African Union, the United Nations, and the Economic
Community of West African States. Using this model, Levitt identifies seven
principles of modem intemational law, including a "recognition of and respect
for preexisting agreements and rules" (p. 11) that ought to undergird any peace
agreement that aspires to be both enduring and just.
Levitt's normative argument in this first section is powerful. In the face of
the many complex forces at play in contemporary Africa, law provides an
objective and enforceable claim to authority that can provide a solid foundation
for a stable government. When power sharing allows those in power to ignore
or rewrite existing agreements, statutes, codes, and even national constitutions,
it replaces the solid foundation of the law with the moral quicksand of political
pragmatism.
At the same time, Levitt's neo-Kadeshian framework is vague in a way
that only becomes apparent as his argument moves on to examine the practical
application of his normative claims. Recognizing and respecting preexisting
agreements and rules, for example, is a noble and important ideal, but not
necessarily a practicable step towards peace. Refusing amnesty to war
criminals, which is one of Levitt's greatest concerns, becomes complicated
when no one agrees on what a war criminal is.
In the next section, Levitt attempts to ground his discussion by looking at
the power-sharing framework in the context of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and
Guinea-Bissau, tracing the countries' fraught recent histories up to
implementation of their respective peace accords. After decades of civil and
political unrest, repeated coups, and violence from both the government and
rebel groups, all three countries developed peace agreements that included
provisions for temporary power sharing pending legal elections. To varying
degrees, the Abuja, Lom6, and Accra Agreements all provided amnesty for
warlords and rebels. None provided a judicial remedy for war victims.
Levitt suggests that these failures place all three treaties in violation of
regional and international law, which guarantee a basic level of human rights
protections and accountability. The Accra and Abuja Agreements, and arguably
the Lom6 Agreement as well, fare worse on a domestic level. The Accra
Agreement went as far as to purge the upper levels of Liberia's existing
government entirely, creating a brand new legislative assembly and a new
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executive including twenty-two ministries and twenty-two public corporations.
It also included a provision that dismissed the entire sitting Supreme Court.
Those radical steps required a suspension of the Constitution, with the
specification that the rules suspended under the Agreement would be reinstated
with the inauguration of an elected government. The Lom6 Agreement kept the
upper levels of Sierra Leone's government mostly intact, but expanded the
government's cabinet to include positions for rebels. While not nearly as
sweeping as the Accra Agreement, it nonetheless violated the Sierra Leonean
Constitution because it was not ratified by Parliament before it went into effect.
The country-specific discussion suffers from Levitt's attempts to
shoehorn the highly individual cases of Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, and Sierra
Leone into the same analysis. He differentiates the Abuja, Lom6, and Accra
Agreements as "moderate," "soft," and "hard" power sharing respectively, but
these distinctions fail to capture the wide range of changes that the Agreements
made to the existing governments. It is difficult to comfortably equate the
extra-constitutional nature of Liberia's complete overhaul of all branches of
government and Sierra Leone's addition of a handful of seats to the cabinet.
Nevertheless, Levitt's fundamental concern is compelling: all of the
Agreements "permitted pirates de la loi to transform into political parties or
partisan leaders" (p. 93).
The final third of the book, which addresses the aftermath of each
agreement, is the least cogent. The overarching goal of this section is to
demonstrate that West Africa's power-sharing arrangements have failed, but,
once again, Levitt's attempts to equate the situations in Liberia, Sierra Leone,
and Guinea-Bissau feel forced. In the years since the 1998 Abuja Agreement,
Guinea-Bissau leads the world in coups and political killings. Liberia, on the
other hand, has been led by the democratically-elected President Ellen Johnson
Sirleaf since 2006. While Levitt emphasizes that the situation in Liberia
remains unstable, plagued by "endemic poverty, chronic illiteracy, contempt for
the rule of law, rapid corruption, and a general lack of infrastructure" (pp. 171-
72), these problems were deeply entrenched long before the Accra Agreement
in 2003. In fact, the six years of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf's presidency mark one of
the longest periods of relative stability in Liberia in decades. While Liberia's
situation remains precarious, Levitt provides no convincing evidence that the
country is destined to slide back into civil war, and offers even less proof that
Liberia's persistent challenges are because of-and not in spite of-the Accra
Agreement.
In fact, the "hard" power sharing of Accra seems to have had a more
positive effect overall than the "moderate" power sharing of Abuja in creating a
measure of stability and peace. This is just one of the inconsistencies Levitt
fails to address when it comes to disentangling the countless strands of
influence that have shaped modern West Africa. If power-sharing agreements
foster a disdain for the law, then how could the Accra Agreement, which
violated existing laws more aggressively than either of the other two
Agreements considered, have led to the most lasting stability?
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More importantly, Levitt avoids the most interesting and controversial
argument regarding power sharing: the question of necessity. Levitt condemns
the Accra Agreement for having "recklessly surrendered [the rule of law] at the
altar of political expediency and necessity" (p. 181) and makes similar
complaints against the Lom6 and Abuja Agreements. This raises an
unanswered question: how does necessity affect legality? In other words, if
power sharing is necessary, then should-or must-that trump normative legal
concerns?
Although he never confronts the tension directly, Levitt approaches a
compromise between the conflicting pulls of necessity and legality in the final
Chapter. However, the measures he proposes to bring power sharing within the
limits of existing law are, by and large, more theoretical than practical. While
the author's recommendations, such as "sending consistent messages," (pp.
239-40) are important, they are not practicable, particularly in moments of
extreme stress and urgency when the author would have them deployed.
The most interesting and practical suggestions Levitt puts forth appear to
back away from an inherent condemnation of many of the principles of power
sharing. Despite a proposed law of power sharing that would prohibit
unconstitutional changes of government, bar warlords and coupists from
holding public office, and foreclose amnesty for those suspected of violating
international law (pp. 240-41), Levitt's more careful analysis reveals an
understanding that there may be room for negotiation. For example, he
proposes that power-sharing agreements include a provision to educate rebels
in "legal, legislative, and governance processes" (p. 240)-a step that seems to
represent a turn away from his earlier contention that pirates de la loi cannot be
a legitimate part of a functioning government.
As a new framework for conflict resolution, Levitt's central principle is
normatively useful, but practically flawed. He makes a convincing case that
power sharing undermines sustainable peace by allowing politics to trump law.
At the same time, he provides no real alternative, and fails to acknowledge
power sharing's successes or to weigh its costs against its benefits. The focus
on the rule of law provides an important counterpoint to a purely political
approach, and Levitt's proposal that existing laws should be followed to the
fullest extent possible should be a central consideration in future power-sharing
arrangements. However, Illegal Peace ultimately has limited real-world
applicability: it lacks simple and clear guidelines for maintaining the rule of
law in post-conflict societies, and fails to acknowledge the unavoidable
pressures of political and practical necessity.
Levitt was recently appointed as a senior member of the International
Technical Assistance Committee (ITAC) of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC) of Liberia, which will provide a key testing ground for
applying the principles he sets forth in this book. Only in action will it be clear
if a legal peace can withstand the urgency of the post-conflict environment.




The Slave Trade and the Origins ofInternational Human Rights Law. By Jenny
S. Martinez. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. 254. Price:
$29.95 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Conrad Scott.
The United Kingdom and the United States proscribed the transatlantic
slave trade by law in 1807, but neither the Slave Trade Act21 nor the Act
Prohibiting Importation of Slaves 22 ended the trade in practice. Slave ships
continued to ply the Atlantic, sailing illicitly to the British Caribbean and the
United States and legally to other New World colonies. Approximately 3.2
million enslaved men, women, and children were loaded onto ships on the
African coast between 1808 and 1866; some 2.8 million landed alive in the
New World.23
In The Slave Trade and the Origins of International Human Rights Law,
Jenny S. Martinez chronicles the role of international law in extirpating the
transatlantic slave trade by the mid-nineteenth century. Slave trade abolition,
she argues, was the first international human rights campaign, and it was
implemented in part by international courts constituted under bilateral and
multilateral treaties. She makes a compelling case that the history of slave trade
abolition challenges the prevailing notion that international human rights law
was conceived in 1945, suggesting alternate conceptions of international human
rights law focused on individual actors and necessitating a rethinking of the
"relationship between power, ideas, and international legal institutions" 24 (p.
165).
British attempts to interdict illicit traffic in human beings began with
"unilateral action based on vague conceptions of natural law," but the exercise
of jurisdiction over slave traders as hostis humani generis (enemies of the
human race) rested on uncertain legal ground (pp. 36-37). As Britain emerged
from the Napoleonic Wars as the dominant naval power of the Atlantic world,
it channeled its power into building international enforcement mechanisms that
were backed by positive law and formally respectful of other nations'
sovereignty. British diplomats bullied and bribed weaker colonial powers into
22. 2 Stat. 426 (1807).
23. Assessing the Slave Trade: Estimates, TRANSATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE DATABASE,
http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/assessmentlestimates.faces (last visited October 20, 2012).
24. See, e.g., JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: DILEMMAS IN WORLD
POLITICS 3 (2d ed. 1998) ("Before World War II, human rights were rarely discussed in international
politics."); OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: CASES, MATERIALS,
COMMENTARY 1 (2010) ("[H]uman rights have migrated to international law since the Second World
War."); DAVID WEISSBRODT & CONNIE DE LA VEGA, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: AN
INTRODUCTION 3 (2007) ("Many observers regard the formation of the United Nations in 1945 and the
promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 as the beginning of the modern
struggle to protect human rights."); Felipe G6mez Isa, International Protection of Human Rights, in
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 22 (Felipe G6mez Isa & Koen de Feyter
eds., 2009) ("The key date on which we begin to witness the internationalization of human rights is
1945, after the Second World War and on the creation of the United Nations Organization."); see also
Ed Bates, History, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 17, 28-9 (David Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah &
Sandesh Sivakumaran, eds., 2010) (describing slave trade abolition as "one of the earliest, if not the
first, human rights related British foreign policy initiatives" while noting that international agreements
prohibiting the slave trade lagged behind states' domestic law).
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accepting treaty clauses providing for mutual rights of peacetime search and
seizure of ships suspected of engaging in the slave trade. Seized ships were
tried before mixed courts composed of two judges, one British and one from
another signatory nation (p. 36). Condemned ships were auctioned off, with
proceeds benefiting signatory nations and rewarding the captains who captured
the prizes. The mixed courts lacked jurisdiction to try slave traders criminally,
and crews were released, sent back to their home countries to be tried for
piracy, or occasionally abandoned on the African coast (p. 77).
The system had terrible weaknesses. Slavers exploited treaty loopholes
and switched flags to evade search and seizure. Critics alleged that the risk of
capture and condemnation led slave traders to maximize profits by packing
their captives even more tightly into ships' holds (p. 113). Banned from going
onshore for "security" reasons in some jurisdictions, individuals held in
interdicted ships died of disease pending adjudication of the ships that held
them (pp. 72-73). Until 1842, Britain's treaty with Portugal provided for the
interdiction of traffic in slaves only in areas north of the Equator, rendering
Portuguese slavers in the Southern Hemisphere immune from condemnation (p.
75). In 1833, the HMS Snake detained the barque Maria da Gloria off Rio de
Janeiro, which was carrying more than 400 slaves loaded in present-day
Angola. (p. 110). The court in Rio de Janeiro held that the Maria da Gloria was
Portuguese, not Brazilian, and refused jurisdiction (pp. 110-11). A British crew
navigated the ship back across the Atlantic to Sierra Leone, where a mixed
Portuguese-British court acquitted it on the grounds that it had been captured
below the Equator, and sent it back to Brazil (pp. 111-12). After three
transatlantic voyages spanning more than five months, only 150 of the more
than 400 Africans on the Maria da Gloria disembarked alive in Brazil to be
sold as slaves (pp. 112-13). Elsewhere, individuals freed by the courts
sometimes found themselves in positions not dissimilar to slavery, trapped in
repeated "apprenticeships" and subject to brutal corporal punishment (pp. 100-
08).
Less tangibly, the courts silenced those whose rights they sought to
protect. Courts catalogued basic information about the human beings who were
slave ships' cargo but rarely allowed them to testify (p. 73). Martinez succeeds
in pulling individual narratives from court records and diplomatic
correspondence (as with the harrowing account of the emancipada Matilda and
her daughter Isabel Marina) (pp. 103-08) and draws compelling parallels
between the courts' silencing of individual Africans and contemporary
international human rights courts' failures to give adequate voice to victims (p.
151).25
These courts nevertheless saved tens of thousands from bondage. They
freed nearly 80,000 captives and condemned unloaded slave ships capable of
carrying approximately 90,000 individuals (p. 79). When the mixed-court
25. See also Jenny S. Martinez, Antislavery Courts, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 160, 161
(2008), http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/633.pdf ("One of the criticisms of modem international
criminal courts is that they afford too little role and respect for the victims of human rights abuses. The
same appears to have been true of these much earlier courts.").
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system later broke down, the existence of international treaties against the slave
trade helped legitimize Britain's unilateral use of force against, and exercise of
jurisdiction over, slavers (p. 82). The example of international slave trade
abolition, Martinez writes, rebuts arguments that international human rights law
is impracticable or ineffective: "People did care. Nations did cooperate. And in
the span of a human life, the transatlantic slave trade was extinguished" (p.
165).
Martinez draws a number of parallels between the mixed courts and
contemporary international human rights law. Most explicitly, she details how
international efforts to interdict the slave trade were undermined by American
constitutional and sovereignty concerns. The United States cooperated closely
with the British for a time but was notably reluctant to constitute mixed courts,
both on Article III grounds and for fear that granting the British peacetime
search rights would offend American dignity and resurrect the contentious issue
of impressment (pp. 43-54, 62-63). American reluctance to constitute mixed
courts or to prosecute foreign slavers enabled ships outfitted for the slave trade
to sail safely under the American flag and delayed the eradication of the slave
trade to Cuba.26 Martinez analogizes the United States' reluctance to sign anti-
slave trade treaties to its contemporary resistance to International Criminal
Court jurisdiction-an imperfect analogy, she notes, but one that suggests that
international courts' ability to advance human rights goal does not necessarily
rely on American support and participation (p. 171).
The mixed courts, Martinez argues, offer more than interesting parallels
to contemporary issues; they suggest alternate conceptions of international
human rights law. International human rights law is commonly described as
beginning with the Nuremberg Trials, but the concept of "crimes against
humanity" was deployed in reference to the slave trade as early as 1842, and
nineteenth-century abolitionists attempted to extend universal jurisdiction over
slavers as enemies of humanity (pp. 114-15). Martinez demonstrates that the
courts were known to international law specialists in the early twentieth
century, though the evidence for their influence on the modern international
human rights framework is tenuous (pp. 151-52).27 The reasons for these
courts' absence from modem histories of international human rights law are
complex, and Martinez advances a number of insightful explanations for why
contemporary histories of international human rights law have started with
1945 and not 1807 (pp. 155-57).
26. Martinez discusses at length the case of The Antelope, in which Chief Justice Marshall
held that the slave trade was not contrary to the law of nations and that the United States could not
unilaterally reclassify slave trading as piracy under the law of nations. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 66, 77
(1825).
27. Martinez observes that two influential pre-Nuremberg texts on international law, I
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATIONS: ANCIENT AND MODERN HISTORY lxxxi (John Bassett Moore ed.,
1929), and MANLEY 0. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS: PAST AND FUTURE 4, 23, 181, 183
(1944), noted the existence of international tribunals to adjudicate captured ships engaged in the slave
trade (pp. 152-53). Other early twentieth-century international criminal law proposals discussed the
slave trade as an international crime (p. 154).
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Locating the origins of international human rights law in the mid-
nineteenth-century suggests an alternate vision of international human rights
law focused on crimes committed by individual, non-state actors, including
terrorists, human traffickers, and corporate human rights violators (pp. 163-64).
Contemporary international human rights law has focused on abuses committed
during periods of armed conflict by individual actors affiliated with extant or
aspiring states; tracing the pre-Nuremberg origins of international human rights
law "highlights the possibility of making international legal mechanisms a
more central tool for addressing human rights violations by private actors
today" (p. 163).
Moreover, the history of the mixed courts suggests a complex relationship
between international human rights law and the use of force. Britain's military
power in the early nineteenth century encouraged weaker powers to sign
treaties that advanced British humanitarian goals for decades afterwards and
legitimized its subsequent unilateral exercise of force. Martinez suggests that
"powerful countries should consider the extent to which international courts
can be a vital tool for adding legitimacy to their actions and entrenching norms
they support." (p. 170). The United States, she notes, might consider
international courts not as threats to its sovereignty but as tools for channeling
and sustaining its power (pp. 170-71).
The Slave Trade and the Abolition of International Human Rights Law is
an innovative and thought-provoking contribution to the history of international
human rights law. As a history of slave trade abolition, its focus on legal
institutions imposes certain limitations. Emphasizing the role of treaties and
courts in bringing about the end of the slave trade risks minimizing the
extralegal means by which the enslaved themselves sought freedom and made
slaving more dangerous and costly. This book might benefit from a discussion
of shipboard revolts and a more-than-passing mention of the Haitian
Revolution.28 It is nevertheless an engaging account of one significant aspect of
slave trade abolition and a worthy addition to the historiography of the subject.
It will be of interest to historians and scholars of international law alike.
Governing the World.: The History of an Idea. By Mark Mazower. New York,
NY: The Penguin Press, 2012. Pp. xix, 475. Price: $29.95 (Hardcover).
Reviewed by Adam Goldenberg.
International institutions are designed in retrospect; they aim to shape the
future by preventing a return to the past.
28. Martinez notes that the Haitian Revolution removed a major supplier from the sugar
market, reducing competition to British commercial interests and thus enabling passage of the Slave Act
of 1807. For more on the complex relationship between the Haitian Revolution and abolition
movements, see, for example, David Brion Davis, Impact ofthe French and Haitian Revolutions, in THE
IMPACT OF THE HAITIAN REVOLUTION IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD 3, 4 (David Patrick Geggus ed., 2001),
which states that "[t]he Haitian Revolution impinged in one way or another on the entire emancipation
debate from the British parliamentary move in 1792 to outlaw the African slave trade to Brazil's final
abolition of slavery ninety-six years later"; and David Patrick Geggus, Preface to THE IMPACT OF THE
HAIAN REVOLUTION IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, at ix (David Patrick Geggus ed., 2001), which details
the complex and at times contradictory impacts of the Haitian Revolution on abolition movements.
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Two world wars in four decades impelled the creation of the League of
Nations, then the United Nations, and then the various organs of European
integration. 2 9 Humanity's failure in Rwanda-and its near miss in the
Balkans-begat the Responsibility to Protect. 30 The Holocaust and its progeny
produced a new name for an old crime ("genocide")3 1 and an often-repeated
promise ("never again").
Some survey this sweep and see hindsight bias. 32 By looking backward,
they argue, we have leaned too much on sunny counterfactuals and optimistic
assumptions about what might have been. 33 In reacting to our own history,
critics claim, we have invited everything from mistakes of policy, 34 to
catastrophic errors in judgment,35 to outright abuse. 3 6
Mark Mazower takes a different view. Rather than focus on the mess of
retrospective moments that make up world history, Governing the World
29. See generally Jorgen Habermas, Why Europe Needs a Constitution, in DEVELOPING A
CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE 17, 18 (Erik Oddvar Eriksen et al. eds., 2004) ("The first generation of
dedicated Euro-federalists set the process [of European integration] in train after World War II ... to put
an end to the bloody history of warfare between European nations . . . .").
30. INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT (2001) [hereinafter ICISS, RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT]; see also 2005 World Summit
Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, 11 138-40, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005) (endorsing the
Responsibility To Protect).
31. See SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE
42-45 (2003); Steven Leonard Jacobs, Genesis of the Concept of Genocide According to Its Author from
the Original Sources, 3 HUM. RTS. REV. 98 (2002).
32. Hindsight bias "refers to a biased representation of events or facts once they are viewed in
hindsight, with knowledge about the outcome." Hartmut Blank et al., Hindsight Bias: On Being Wise
After the Event, 25 SOC. COGNITION 1, 2-3 (2007). See generally Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight Is Not
Equal to Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 288 (1975) (pioneering the concept of "hindsight bias").
33. See, e.g., Stephen Wertheim, A Solution From Hell: The United States and the Rise of
Humanitarian Interventionism, 1991-2003, 12 J. GENOCIDE RES. 149, 154-58 (2010).
34. See, e.g., Christoph 0. Meyer et al., Recasting the Warning-Response Problem:
Persuasion and Preventive Policy, 12 INT'L STUD. REV. 556, 564 ("With the benefit of hindsight comes
a tendency to focus on failures of preventive action, while successes remain invisible both in terms of
cognitive impact and action on the ground.").
35. See, e.g., Wertheim, supra note 33, at 165-67 (describing support for the 2003 Iraq War
among "humanitarian interventionists," including Michael Ignatieff); Michael Ignatieff, Getting Iraq
Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2007, (Magazine), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/05/magazine/05iraq-t.html
("Many of us believed, as an Iraqi exile friend told me the night the war started, that [the war] was the
only chance the members of his generation would have to live in freedom in their own country. How
distant a dream that now seems.").
36. See ANNE ORFORD, INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY AND THE RESPONSIBILITY To PROTECT
72 (2011) (describing Belgium's purported "humanitarian intervention" into the Congo in 1960); id. at
134 ("The deprivations of liberty in the absolutist states of early modern Europe, the police actions of
colonial powers and the terror inflicted by the security forces of fascist Germany were all explained as
exercises in institutionalizing protection."); Joelle Tanguy, Redefining Sovereignty and Intervention, 17
ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 141, 147 (2003) (reviewing ICISS, RESPONSIBILITY To PROTECT, supra note 30)
("[Iln the 1990s, humanitarianism was used as a fig leaf for political neglect or for self-interested
intervention. In the coming era, the rights discourse is likely to be further instrumentalized."); see also
Adam Goldenberg, Book Note, 37 YALE J. INT'L L. 219, 221 (2012) (reviewing ORFORD, supra) ("At
last fall's General Assembly session ... Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe invoked [the
Responsibility to Protect] even as he denounced the NATO mission in Libya, and Syrian Foreign
Minister Walid Al-Moualem proudly described his government's 'responsibility to protect its citizens."'
(quoting Walid Al-Moualem, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of the Syrian Arab Rep.,
Address at the General Debate of the Sixty-Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly
(Sept. 26, 2011))).
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locates the primary theme: "Somewhere ... between world government and no
government, lies a vision of organized cooperation among nations .. . of the
kind that has inspired the United Nations, the European Union, and other such
multilateral organizations" (p. xiii).
Mazower's central characters are the Great Powers. He begins with the
nineteenth-century Concert of Europe, which "survived because too much was
at stake [for Austria, Russia, Britain, Prussia, and France] for it not to" (p. 9).
Later chapters proceed chronologically, presenting subsequent developments-
from the early twentieth-century international arbitration movement (p. 90), to
the League of Nations (pp. 117-53), to the modern United Nations (pp. 191-
213)-as similar products of power calculations by self-interested states. Even
the Responsibility to Protect, to Mazower, "looks like nothing so much as the
return of the civilizing mission and the 'humanitarian' interventions of previous
centuries ... [such as] Fascist Italy's cynical rationalization of its invasion of
Ethiopia in 1935 as an intervention in the name of civilization. . ." (p. 395).3
Might makes rights, too.
Though Mazower describes more than merely the moves of the major
powers, he mostly understands history through the rational, national interest-
based politics of state actors.38 The result is an overwhelming focus on power
itself; in writing a history of internationalist idealism, Mazower seems to have
convinced himself that such idealism is ultimately illusory.
But what, then, of international law? Mazower asserts that a "robust
international law regime" is antithetical to the diplomatic paradigm of the
League of Nations and the United Nations because both reflect "the preference
of [their] founders to preserve the political discretion of [their] members" (p.
153). After a century of conflict between "wise statesmen" and "well-meaning
but impotent lawyers" (p. 238) the outcome has been "[f]aw's demise" (p. 256).
But this is so only if "international law" is reduced to what Mazower
presents as its mid-nineteenth-century ideal type: "a complete alternative mode
of conducting relations between states," one that would "transform[] the
conservative order . .. and challeng[e] the authority of diplomats" (p. 66). More
than a century later, Mazower laments, the dreams of the earlier epoch remain
unrequited: "Despite the endless invocation of the 'rule of law' by American
administrations and international agencies . . . what international law in
particular really stands for today is not at all clear" (p. 402). We are left,
instead, with a pessimistic view of international law as the systematized
37. For a more optimistic take on the role of U.S. power in sustaining the human rights
movement, see ARYEH NEIER, THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT: A HISTORY 317
(2012), which states that "[n]o government, and no intergovernmental body... now plays a role
comparable to that of the United States in the quarter-century prior to the [September 11, 2011] terrorist
attacks on New York and Washington"; and Michael Ignatieff, Op-Ed., Is the Human Rights Era
Ending?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/05/opinion/is-the-human-rights
-era-ending.html, which argues that "[tjhe humanitarian interventions of the 1990s ... [were] made
possible because Western militaries had spare capacity and time to do human rights work."
38. See GRAHAM ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
4-7 (1971) (distinguishing "Model I" analysis, which examines "Rational Actor" behavior at the state
level, from "Model IH" analysis, which "focuses on the politics [within] a government").
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aggregation of states' rational preferences-the set of rules by which rational
state actors choose to live.39  Despite the best hopes of its founders,
international law does not check power; if anything, Mazower posits, the
converse is the case.
As Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro have argued, this basic criticism of
international law is misguided in its simplicity. Yet Mazower leaves us with a
picture of international law as a tool of moral subjectivity, a sort of useful
idiocy for darker diplomatic schemes. He takes pains to remind us that modem
international law was born out of imperialist beliefs in "the superiority of
European civilization" (p. 70), and he highlights in particular the role of the
South African Jan Smuts-an apostle of Apartheid-in the founding of the
League of Nations (pp. 131-35). Mazower draws a straight, simple line between
the legal language used to legitimate colonial occupation-the "language of
responsibilities, care, and duties"-and "the vocabulary with which a
postcolonial 'international community' now validates rule by its own executive
organs, in the shape of the United Nations" (p. 73). This is an increasingly
familiar line of argument-that the rhetoric of protection is suspect because it
has been deployed for deplorable purposes in ages past.4 '
Mazower has written elsewhere that "[w]e live in an age in which the so-
called international community, driven by the west's ethical concerns, no
longer respects the sanctity of state sovereignty or the inviolability of borders,
and intervenes more readily on humanitarian grounds than at any time in the
past century."42 He may be right. But why is that for the worse? True,
international law now permits intervention to prevent atrocities. But is such
moral objectivity really objectionable just because its rhetoric is superficially
similar to some sinister antecedents? Perhaps, Mazower suggests, but
persecuted populations might beg to differ.
Mazower seems to see the pretexts of the past in the pretentions of the
present, and his retelling of the history of international law suffers for it. Out of
his focus on state-level power politics emerges a deep suspicion with
international institutions-a degree of skepticism that is more appropriately
applied retrospectively than prospectively. Here, Mazower's contribution is as
much hypothesis as history; whether internationalism will yet atone for its
39. For elaboration of the argument that international law "can be binding and robust only
when it is rational for states to comply with it," see JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 202 (2005). For a statement by a then soon-to-be U.S. diplomat that lends
support to this view, see John R. Bolton, Is There Really "Law" in International Affairs?, 10
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 48 (2000). But see TAi-HENG CHENG, WHEN INTERNATIONAL
LAW WORKS: REALISTIC IDEALISM AFTER 9/11 AND THE GLOBAL RECESSION 119 (2012) ("Legalism
confers stability to international relations and manages change according to shared expectations of
appropriate conduct.").
40. Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and
International Law, 121 YALE L.J. 252 (2011) (arguing for the legitimacy of international law by
presenting the threat of exclusion-"outcasting"-as a means of coercive enforcement).
41. See ORFORD, supra note 36 (making this argument).
42. Mark Mazower, 'From the Ruins of Empire,' FIN. TIMES (London), June 27, 2012,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/421c4c26-d4bd-lIel-9444-00144feabdcO.html (reviewing PANKA MISHRA,
FROM THE RUINS OF EMPIRE: THE REVOLT AGAINST THE WEST AND THE REMAKING OF ASIA (2012)).
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original sins remains to be seen. But when the time comes to take the measure
of modem international institutions, Governing the World will serve as a useful
benchmark. As a work of history, though unfinished, it is an impressive
achievement.
People, States and Hope: Cosmopolitanism and the Future of International
Law. By Trevor Redmond. Nijmegen, the Netherlands: Wolf Legal
Publishers, 2012. Pp. 465. Price: $53.75 (Paperback). Reviewed by
Trinity Brown.
In her 1994 essay Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, Martha Nussbaum
invokes the oft-cited account of Diogenes, the fourth-century B.C. Greek
philosopher who famously proclaimed himself to be "a citizen of the world." 4 3
Noah Feldman's more recent 2007 piece, Cosmopolitan Law?, takes up that
anecdote to similar effect." Both Nussbaum and Feldman suggest that this
moment was the beginning of a continuing conversation around a cosmopolitan
ideal, one that emphasizes "the role of the individual and the moral
responsibilities he or she may have beyond the boundaries of his or her own
state" (p. 17). Trevor Redmond's People, States and Hope: Cosmopolitanism
and the Future of International Law furthers that dialogue, envisioning how
citizens, nations, and an improved international law regime might engage
proactively with the crisis of transnational economic inequality.
With this central question in mind, Redmond frames his project broadly,
as an "explor[ation of] the role of international law in transforming a minimal
order between states into a cosmopolitan community of humankind" (p. 17).
Redmond focuses on the application of Andrew Linklater's "manifesto for
international relations theory"-including Linklater's principles of inclusion
and exclusion-to the context of international law (p. 17). People, States and
Hope is largely descriptive and deeply rooted in theory; Redmond devotes
sizeable portions of the book to presenting and unpacking existing scholarship
on cosmopolitan and international relations theory. Perhaps because it is so
broad in scope, he is able to engage only briefly with practical mechanisms for
realizing transnational distributive justice. Despite that broad focus, Redmond
makes strong and nuanced arguments for cosmopolitanism as a legitimate and
"intellectually respectable" (p. 397) guiding principle for addressing the
shortcomings of international law.
Redmond seems especially conscious of the need to account for popular
critiquies that cite potential shortcomings of cosmopolitan theory. He actively
addresses the opposing viewpoints of legal realists and of those who defer to a
communitarian, or state-centered, ordering of the international legal landscape.
Notably, he preempts criticism even in the title of his book, which is inspired
43. Martha C. Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, Bos. REv., Oct./Nov. 1994
http://bostonreview.net/BRI9.5/nussbaum.php.
44. Noah Feldman, Cosmopolitan Law?, 116 YALE L.J. 1022, 1027 (2007).
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by Barry Buzan's work on national security in People, States and Fear.4 5
Redmond is appropriately strategic in responding to these criticisms, advancing
his argument incrementally and in a way that makes it difficult for skeptics to
summarily dismiss his ideas as "idealistic utopianism" (p. 48). Redmond
rigorously historicizes and contextualizes his argument as a logical product of
an ongoing dialogue between diverse political and international relations
theories. This contextualization makes his argument accessible to readers
outside of an international law context, but also serves his work by giving it the
strong theoretical basis that an argument for a paradigmatic shift demands.
Chapter Six, for example, which considers Kant's and Redmond's idea of "The
New Cosmopolitanism," literally proceeds in "steps" rather than traditional
sections. In this Chapter, Redmond's framing of his argument is especially
effective insofar as he is able to recast Kant's international reform project and
theory of liberal internationalism as precursors to his own conception of
cosmopolitanism. That effective framing allows Redmond's argument to have
some traction, even with those readers who might otherwise see his views as
radical.
Redmond is also particularly adept at framing his argument historically,
restructuring our perceptions of historical moments in cosmopolitan terms. For
example, while Redmond readily highlights the inability of the United Nations
to fully implement its stated economic development goals in its 1949 National
and International Measures for Full Employment (pp. 32-33), he challenges the
popular notion that resistance to cosmopolitan values by political powers
necessarily drives such failures. Redmond goes on to present U.N. policy
failures alongside statements from political leaders: President Harry Truman's
1949 Inaugural Address, in which he refers to a "decent, satisfying life" as "the
right of all people" (p. 32), and President John F. Kennedy's 1961 address to
the U.N. General Assembly, in which he prioritizes the need to confront
"poverty and illiteracy and disease" over self-determination and sovereignty (p.
34). In juxtaposing moments like these, Redmond insinuates cosmopolitan
values into popular historical narratives. Accordingly, the book effectively
situates cosmopolitanism as a realistic, and even familiar, concept.
In keeping with Kennedy's comments, People, States and Hope suggests
that it is the very notion of state sovereignty that partially accounts for the
failure of international law to embrace cosmopolitanism and, by extension, to
take seriously the problem of transnational inequality. Redmond does not
advocate abandoning the nation as a unit of organization, but instead takes
issue with the centrality of the idea of the sovereign state in our international
legal scheme. Redmond refers to this problem as indicative of "international
law's foundational assumption, namely the communitarian sovereign state" (p.
103). In devoting a chapter to the consideration of the problem presented by
such an assumption, Redmond calls international law to task for subjecting
itself to the so-called "law of statehood" in such a way that the entire
45. BARRY BUZAN, PEOPLE, STATES AND FEAR: THE NATIONAL SECURITY PROBLEM IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1983).
2013] 28 1
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 38: 253
international law regime is impaired. Redmond's argument successfully
challenges both the historical narrative of the sovereign state and the
underlying political theory that allows for its perpetuation. By substantively
challenging several of the prevailing theoretical frameworks, such as contract
theory, which privilege the concept of the state in keeping with a
communitarian ideal, People, States and Hope forces us to recognize the
limitations of these ideas and prompts realization of the extent to which such
limitations restrict the potential for distributive and transnational economic
justice.
Redmond correctly recognizes that these limitations have potentially far-
reaching implications for individuals, or citizens, living within states. In
speaking to the problem of citizenship within a communitarian system,
Redmond's argument is particularly compelling. By highlighting the inability
of states to respond to individual needs as a key indicator of the need for a new
paradigm, Redmond presents the fundamental failures of the state as evidence
of a need for change.
However, although Redmond correctly identifies migration and
globalization as factors underlying the increasingly complex notion of
citizenship, his argument ultimately suffers from his incomplete engagement
with the topic. Redmond does not address how the problem of citizenship
might be addressed if the ideal he advocates is adopted. This omission is
particularly salient because he argues for "a moderate form of
cosmopolitanism," in which "the state is recognised as a legitimate source of
obligations and loyalty, so long as a minimum degree of welfare or capabilities
is first guaranteed to all persons everywhere" (p. 406). Lacking from
Redmond's analysis is a discussion of the tension that would result between the
state's external duty to non-citizens in need and its internal obligations to its
own citizens. Under a moderate cosmopolitan system, it is unclear how a state
might evaluate the relationship between the expectations of its citizens and its
obligations to them in the event that external duties affect existing national
norms. Similarly, we are left to wonder how less developed states might
reconstitute citizenship if the needs of their citizens are largely being met by
other states. While Redmond's overall argument is strong, these ambiguities
render his vision somewhat incomplete.
Similarly troubling is Redmond's relatively brief discussion of viable
mechanisms for realizing distributive justice. Although he grounds
cosmopolitanism as a potential theory, he does not sufficiently articulate what a
cosmopolitan social justice framework would look like in practice. In one of
the final chapters, Redmond does provide several examples of distributive
justice initiatives, such as the Monterrey Consensus (pp. 383-84) and Garrett
Wallace Brown's concept of a cosmopolitan constitution (pp. 391-92), but it
remains somewhat unclear how these structures map onto Redmond's moderate
cosmopolitanism. Since Redmond argues that transnational economic
inequality may be best remedied by institutional-rather than individual-
means, his readers would certainly benefit from a more detailed analysis of
these structures. Thus, while Redmond pushes international legal structures to
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invest in a cosmopolitan theory and vision, his mechanisms for reimagining
these structures are not entirely clear.
That being said, People, States and Hope provides much-needed direction
in envisioning a cosmopolitan system, particularly for international law
scholars and practitioners. While Redmond emphasizes the need for
identification with cosmopolitan principles on an individual level, he ultimately
makes a strong argument for institutional change. The author advocates the
reorganization of institutional global structures around a cosmopolitan system
and calls for individuals and nations to hold those structures accountable to a
social justice agenda. Most importantly, Redmond does more than simply
suggest that such a system is possible. Towards the end of the book, he invokes
Charles Beitz's example of the international trade scheme as an existing space
of social cooperation, one that could potentially be instrumental in
implementing a larger distributive project (pp. 367-68). Redmond does not
provide a well-defined path to transnational economic justice, but he is clearly
invested in taking the project beyond mere theory. In this way, People, States
and Hope is most useful in providing a strong theoretical framework and a
starting point for implementation. Redmond is a compelling advocate for
cosmopolitanism as a basis for distributive justice, and he vehemently pushes
for a legal system that moves beyond the restrictions of strict
communitarianism so that it might begin to address the global poverty crisis. In
doing so, Redmond most convincingly advocates for hope, challenging
practitioners of international law to carve out spaces for its realization.
Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, 1815-
1914. By Davide Rodogno. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2012. Pp. 391. Price: $39.50 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Will Smiley.
Writing in March 2011, as the United States, Britain, and France debated
intervention in Libya, Davide Rodogno suggested that those states would
"probably be faced with a stark choice between waiting until massive numbers
of lives have been lost or reaching rushed agreement on forceful action in
response to ambiguous evidence before tragedy strikes" (p. 274). That insight
comes at the end of Rodogno's new book, Against Massacre, which addresses
nineteenth-century interventions in the Ottoman Empire-a topic as timely
now, with questions about Syrian intervention looming, as it was during the
Libyan conflict.
The backdrop for Rodogno's discussion is the "Eastern Question" in
nineteenth-century European diplomacy: how were the great powers to deal
with the military weakness of the Ottoman Empire? More pointedly, what was
to be done about the domestic violence unleashed in the Ottoman Empire as
independence movements, shrinking borders, economic dislocation, and state
attempts at centralization collided, often resulting in atrocious brutality against
unarmed Ottoman subjects? On a number of occasions, France, Britain, and
Russia invoked their concern over atrocities against Ottoman Christians as they
took action within the Ottoman Empire. Rodogno asks why the powers acted in
some instances of massacre, but not others, and to what extent these actions
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were motivated either by imperial expansion, or by "humanitarian
intervention"-a term which he defines as "a coercive diplomatic and/or armed
(re)action against massacre undertaken by a state or a group of states inside the
territory of a target state" (p. 2).
Rodogno's topic is not only timely and fascinating, but also remarkably
unstudied. The only major work to cover similar ground is Gary Bass's 2008
book Freedom's Battle.4 6 Bass drew lessons for the present day from
nineteenth-century interventions-that democracy and a free press in Western
countries can propel beneficial humanitarian interventions, and that such
interventions are best pursued multilaterally.47 Rodogno covers much of the
same factual ground, though in greater historical depth-and he emerges less
encouraged by the past, and less optimistic about the future.
Rodogno uses his first two chapters to lay down the background of
nineteenth-century intervention in theory and practice, and to place the
Ottoman Empire in (or rather, outside) the international legal system. European
powers, he argues, did not intervene in the affairs of sovereign states, unless
those states were seen as beyond the pale of civilization-which the Ottoman
Empire was, according to many Europeans. But that seems too sweeping of a
conclusion. Rodogno does not account for more nuanced work suggesting that
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the Ottoman Empire was
part of the European system of "diplomatic relations and international legal
institutions,"48 and was a signatory to treaties which British Ambassador to
Istanbul Robert Ainslie called "hitherto respected as sacred, and accounted
binding by all civilized Nations of whatever Religion." 49 More broadly, both
chapters seem to flatten historical changes over the course of the nineteenth
century. The authors Rodogno cites in his intellectual history of Ottoman
exclusion, and the international legal scholars he references who discussed
intervention, almost all date to the end of the nineteenth century, leaving one to
wonder whether the early- and mid-century events Rodogno discusses in the
following chapters were shaped by these views--or whether the events helped
to create them.
In Chapters Three through Ten, Rodogno takes up a number of case
studies of French and British interventions within Ottoman territory, which
sometimes involved Russia as well. The character of these European
interventions varied widely; some were violent (as at the 1827 Battle of
Navarino), and others were not (as with efforts in Macedonia); some led to
46. See GARY J. BASS, FREEDOM'S BATTLE: THE ORIGINS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
(2008).
47. Id. at 6-8, 31-38.
48. Ilber Ortayli, Ottoman-Habsburg Relations and Structural Changes in the International
Affairs of the Ottoman State (1740-1770), in TORKISCHE MISZELLEN 287, 288 (Jean-Louis Bacqud-
Grammont et al. eds., 1987).
49. Letter from Robert Ainslie to London (Jun. 22, 1791) (on file with The National Archives
of Great Britain, Foreign Office Papers Collection, Series 78, vol. 12A, letter #15). The context leaves it
unclear whether the words are Ainslie's, or whether he was translating the statement of an Ottoman
official. For a number of recent studies of Ottoman diplomacy, see OTTOMAN DIPLOMACY:
CONVENTIONAL OR UNCONVENTIONAL? (A. Nuri Yurdusev ed., 2004).
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wider wars (as in the 1820s and 1870s), and some did not. Perhaps most
interestingly to modem legal scholars, many interventions were justified by
appeals to treaty law and were undertaken with Ottoman consent-suggesting
they might have been considered legal even in today's post-U.N. Charter world.
What unifies these case studies is Rodogno's view that they are all
"interventions," and not "wars"-even when violence was involved. He
considers some "humanitarian," and others not. He judges, for example, that
Navarino was not a humanitarian intervention because it "did not save strangers
or bring immediate relief to Greek civilian populations" (p. 83), and that the
1877-1878 Russo-Turkish War, justified by atrocities in Bulgaria, was
disqualified as "humanitarian" because it involved Russian territorial expansion
(p.164). The basis for these judgments, however, is somewhat slippery.
Although Rodogno provides his own definition of "humanitarian intervention,"
he often leaves the reader unsure whether he is classifying particular actions
based on that definition, on contemporary views, or on late nineteenth-century
legal perspectives.
Throughout, Rodogno bases his discussion on extensive British and
French archival documentation, along with an impressive array of printed work
from the second half of the nineteenth century. Unfortunately, for linguistic
reasons, Rodogno was unable to access Ottoman archives, newspapers, or
memoirs, leaving both Ottoman officials and the survivors of massacres
voiceless in his narrative. This is an unfortunate omission, especially because
Rodogno does not consistently draw upon Ottomanist secondary literature-a
field that has grown enormously in recent decades, since the opening of the
Ottoman Baybakanhk archives in Istanbul.50 Rodogno recognizes his resulting
limitations, noting that histories "of the interventions from the perspective of
the target state (which can only be written by an Ottomanist) or from the
perspective of the victims of massacre and atrocities" are yet to be undertaken
(pp. 2-3). In the meantime, he offers the caveat that, rather than searching for
the truth of each incident on the ground, he "starts from the accounts of
massacres as European observers and diplomats reported them" (p. 3). Such
methodological caution is commendable, but as the book goes on, Rodogno at
times seems nonetheless to take European accounts at face value.
Such accounts are almost entirely French and British; despite the
important role of Russia in Rodogno's narrative, the view from St. Petersburg
is largely absent. This is regrettable because the threat of Russo-Ottoman war
was at the core of the "Eastern Question." It was fear of such wars-invariably
ending in Russian victories-that led the British to favor intervention in the
1820s, and to oppose it in the 1870s, but on both occasions, the Russians
ultimately deployed humanitarian arguments as they went to war with the
Ottomans. This leaves the reader wondering whether, from the Russian
viewpoint, Navarino appears simply as the opening battle in one of the
50. Among Ottomanist works conspicuously absent from Rodogno's bibliography are M.
$OKRO HANIOCLU, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE LATE OTTOMAN EMPIRE (2008); RE$AT KASABA, A
MOVEABLE EMPIRE: OTTOMAN NOMADS, MIGRANTS, AND REFUGEES (2009); and DONALD QUATAERT,
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 1700-1922 (2d ed. 2005).
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numerous eighteenth-and nineteenth-century Russo-Ottoman wars, rather
than as a separate instance of intervention. Likewise, Rodogno quickly
dismisses the possibility that the 1877-1878 Russo-Turkish War was
"humanitarian," invoking the later opinion of Yale legal scholar Theodore
Woolsey (p. 164)-but was this the Russian view? More broadly, the Russian
Empire had a history of legal innovation in its relations with the Ottoman
Empire. For example, late eighteenth-century treaty law, contrary to popular
myth, did not give the Russians a general right of intervention on behalf of
Ottoman Christians 52-but the Russians did gain, and then quickly relinquish, a
right to demand the liberation of all Christian slaves in the Ottoman Empire.5 3
This unique history of Russo-Ottoman legal relations is invisible in
Rodogno's French- and British-centered story. This is regrettable because,
when official Ottoman voices do filter through in Rodogno's French and
British sources, they suggest that Russia was central to the Ottomans' own
view of their situation-and to their objections to intervention. For example,
Ottoman Grand Vizier Ali Pasha complained in 1867, in the midst of debates
over unrest on Crete, that Russia should not speak about "the outraged rights of
humanity[,] when to maintain her rights in Poland, she crushed a nation which
also demanded its independence .. . [and] when she exiled to Siberia women in
mourning for their fathers and brothers (p. 118).54 The Ottomans, on other
words, contested the application of international law, arguing that the French
and British held a double standard based on target states' power, or their
perceived civilizational level. And this was precisely the point, Rodogno
contends: European states did sometimes have humanitarian motives, but
power politics and cultural biases constrained their actions. Russia was
untouchable; the Ottomans were not.
Uneven responses, Rodogno argues, still characterize intervention today.
His book closes by putting twentieth- and twenty-first century interventions in
conversation with nineteenth-century events. He notes the continued
complexity of post-intervention rebuilding (p. 267), the role of press coverage
for atrocities (p. 269), and the persistent tendency to ignore atrocities against
groups perceived as themselves being "guilty" of massacres. In the nineteenth
century, the "guilty" groups in western European eyes were Ottoman Muslims;
in the twentieth century, they were Hutus, Iraqi Sunnis, and most prominently,
Serbs.55 Rodogno could have taken these observations further, and readers may
find that the historical data he provides can address other theoretical questions.
51. For these conflicts, see generally VIRGINIA H. AKSAN, OTTOMAN WARS 1700-1870: AN
EMPIRE BESIEGED (2007).
52. Although it is not clear from the body of his work (p. 29), Rodogno's footnotes (for
example, p. 287 n.37) show that, unlike Bass, he is aware of Roderic Davison's research demonstrating
that the 1774 Treaty of KiiUilk Kaynarca was not originally understood to include such a right. See
BASS, supra note 46, at 354, 360-61; Roderic H. Davison, "Russian Skill and Turkish Imbecility": The
Treaty ofKuchuk Kainardji Reconsidered, 35 SLAVIC REV. 463 (1976).
53. See Will Smiley, Let Whose People Go? Subjecthood, Sovereignty, Liberation, and
Legalism in Eighteenth-Century Russo-Ottoman Relations, 3 TURKISH HIST. REV. 196 (2012).
54. Reviewer's translation.
55. See Deana Kjuka, Madeline Albright's Scrap with Pro-Serbian Activists in a Prague
Bookstore, ATLANTIC, Oct. 29, 2012, http://www.theatlantic.com/internationallarchive/2012/10/madeleine
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Ultimately, Rodogno is less optimistic about the future than Bass was,
though he rejects reductionist views of both past and present interventions as
nothing more than naked imperialism. For Bass, the 1999 Kosovo conflict
inspired hope that Western media and political freedoms would propel future
multilateral interventions.56 Rodogno, in contrast, sees that intervention as only
"an exception rather than a meaningful precedent for a new international
practice" (p. 261). He concludes that, despite the proposed norm of
"Responsibility to Protect," "the current paradigm of humanitarian intervention
is not entirely different from that of the nineteenth century" (p. 274).
Intervening states will continue to act with mixed motives, inconsistently,
selectively, after the fact, and only against weak target states.
From a legal perspective, Rodogno raises at least as many questions as he
answers. His own definition of humanitarian intervention begs to be
disaggregated into a number of historical and legal questions about its
components. Given that the concept of humanitarian intervention itself seems
to have changed over the course of the nineteenth century, to what extent did
law shape practice, and practice shape law? In other words, what, in legal
terms, did European policymakers think they were doing at the time they did it?
How important was, and is, the distinction between an "intervention" and a
"war"? If most interventions were authorized by Ottoman consent, where does
this leave our understanding of the historical development of one of the most
hotly contested issues in current international law: the use of force against the
wishes of a sovereign state?
In summary, Rodogno brings a welcome historical perspective to a vital
topic, enriching the debate with archivally-based arguments. Although his
archives could have benefited from more diversity, and his arguments could
have been more pointed, the book breaks new ground and provides a
fascinating narrative that will be of great interest to historians, legal academics,
and international relations scholars alike.
-albrights-scrap-with-pro-serbian-activists-in-a-prague-bookstore/
2 6 4 2 4 5/ (reporting on an altercation in
which Albright referred to protesters against U.S. actions in Kosovo as "disgusting Serbs").
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